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This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph
where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral
interaction. It departs from the standard Katz-Shapiro framework by assuming
that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It
shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of
network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up
the market and earn positive profits.
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It has long been known that some goods and services (for example, telecom-
munications, computer software and hardware) generate network eﬀects or
externalities. The seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985) deﬁnes a net-
work eﬀect to exist when the utility that a user derives from consuming
a product depends on the number of other agents who consume either the
same brand of the product, or another brand which is compatible. This way
of modelling of the network eﬀect is found throughout the large literature
that has developed.1 While this is reasonable in many contexts, we feel that
in other instances it overlooks the fact that such positive externalities arise
from the speciﬁc patterns of interaction between groups of users.
The examples we have in mind are primarily of software packages with
speciﬁc functions such as word processing, accounting, data analysis and so
on. The use of such packages have local network eﬀects. Thus the utility to a
user (say, a researcher in a University) of a word processing or data analysis
package depends at least partly on the number of her research collaborators
who use the same package, rather than on the total number of users of the
package. A main advantage to two collaborators using the same package is
sharing ﬁles. In many of these markets, there is a degree of incompatibility
between brands. Two users using incompatible brands ﬁnd it diﬃcult if not
impossible to share ﬁles; a program written on one software package cannot
be read, or worked on, using a competing brand. Patterns of interaction and
the generation of such local network eﬀects can be observed in other kinds of
1There is by now a large literature analyzing important issues in markets subject to network eﬀects.
See, for instance Katz and Shapiro (1985, 1986), Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Economides and Salop
(1992), Farrell and Katz (2000), Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Choi (1994), Ellison and Fudenberg (2000),
Waldman (1993). Economides (1996) provides an insightful overview.economic activity as well. For example, in an environment where back oﬃce
activities are outsourced, ﬁrms which manage outsourcing operations beneﬁt
from having systems and software compatible with clients’ software.
We use the formal network structure proposed in the important recent pa-
per of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) to model the interaction between groups
of users. In particular, the set of all consumers is partitioned into diﬀerent
groups or nodes, and two nodes are connected to each other if they “interact”2.
Our main interest is in analysing whether the precise pattern of interactions
- that is, the speciﬁc network structure- has any inﬂuence on market out-
comes. For instance, suppose the overall “market” is the academic market
for software. Does the fact that economists typically do not collaborate with
physicists (that is, economists are not “linked” to physicists) matter in this
market?
Since our model is motivated by examples such as software packages, ca-
pacity constraints are unimportant. It seems natural to assume that ﬁrms
have unlimited capacity, and hence compete in prices. If ﬁrms produce com-
peting, incompatible brands of the same intrinsic quality, and have the same
constant marginal cost of production, existing models of network externali-
ties would yield the Bertrand zero proﬁt outcome. This is so for the Katz
and Shapiro (1985) model as well, if it is modiﬁed to analyze price, rather
than quantity competition. The main result in this paper is that if network
eﬀects are generated from patterns of interaction among users, then there
exist outcomes in which ﬁrms do make positive proﬁts, and there is market
segmentation in the sense that rival ﬁrms divide or partition the overall mar-
2Although this kind of modelling has not been used so far in the literature on network externalities, the
use of such network structures in other areas of economics is becoming increasingly popular. Dutta and
Jackson (2003) contains several interesting papers in this genre.ket into separate segments, with each ﬁrm selling to diﬀerent segments. This
accords well with casual observation, which suggests positive proﬁt outcomes
arise even when ﬁrms compete in prices and capacity is essentially unlimited.
Furthermore, we show that the graph (or interaction) structure graph (or
interaction) structure matters; for some graphs, market segmentation can
be ruled out in equilibrium. Thus, one way of interpreting our results is to
say that there are interaction structures which convert the industry into a
diﬀerentiated goods industry. However, there are other interaction structures
- for instance, the complete graph where all users are linked to each other
- where the goods remain homogeneous, and so ﬁrms do not earn positive
proﬁts. The discussion also shows that when positive proﬁt equilibria exist, if
ﬁrms could choose whether or not to make their brands mutually compatible,
they would choose not to do so.
Recently, work on intermediation in two-sided markets (for example, mar-
kets for matchmaking services)has begun to analyze the consequences of the
network beneﬁt that one side of the market confers on the other.3 The ex-
amples we cite show that patterns of interaction between groups of users can
be more general. In this paper we make a beginning in attempting to under-
stand how such interaction, and local network eﬀects, aﬀect market outcomes
under oligopoly.
2 A Model of Network Externalities
Our model of network externalities in the context of a partial equilibrium
duopoly has similarities to that of Katz and Shapiro (1985). A major diﬀer-
ence is in the way in which we model network externalities. Another diﬀerence
3Armstrong (2002) provides a very interesting survey.is that in our model ﬁrms compete in prices, in contrast to Katz and Shapiro
(1985) who assumed that ﬁrms behaved a la Cournot.
Consumers
Consumers are partitioned into groups, and each group “interacts” with
some but not necessarily all groups. For instance, consider the set of all
faculty members in a university. Each department then constitutes a group.
Economists may collaborate with political scientists and mathematicians, but
perhaps not with physicists or other scientists. Similarly, members of the
science departments may interact with each other, but not with sociologists.
The pattern of such interactions is modeled as an undirected graph or network
(I;g) where I is a set of n nodes and g ½ I £I is a set of arcs. Each group of
consumers is located at a diﬀerent node i 2 I, and ij 2 g if consumers located
at node i interact with consumers located at j. We assume that consumers
within each group interact with each other and that if some consumers at
node i interact with some consumers at j, then all consumers located at i
interact with all consumers at j.4
We will say that the network (I;g) is complete if g = fijjij 2 I£Ig. That
is, all groups interact with all other groups in a complete network - this would
correspond to the original Katz-Shapiro model of network externalities.
For each node i, let L(i) = fj 2 Ijij 2 gg. That is, L(i) is the set of nodes
that are linked to node i.
Let ®i denote the measure of consumers located at node i.5 Each consumer
wishes to consume at most one unit of a good. There are two brands of the
4This is without loss of generality since we can deﬁne the set of nodes appropriately in order to represent
any pattern of interaction.
5Any single consumer has zero measure.good - for example, diﬀerent types of software. The two brands diﬀer in
inessential ways in the sense that each brand is functionally identical as far
as consumers are concerned. Let ri denote the basic willingness to pay for
the good of a consumer who is located at node i. However, the total utility
or surplus that a consumer gets from a particular brand of the good also
depends on the number of other consumers with whom she interacts and who
consume the same brand. Let pj be the price of a unit of brand j, and ®sj be
the measure of consumers at node s who consume brand j. Then the utility
of a consumer at node i from buying a unit of brand j is




So, by consuming brand j, a consumer at node i gets a gross beneﬁt ri
and a network beneﬁt of ®ij +
P
s2L(i)




as the hedonic price of brand j at node i.
Given any vector of prices, each consumer purchases the brand whose
hedonic price is lower or abstains from buying either brand if both hedonic
prices exceed her basic willingness to pay. Of course, each consumer has to
have some expectation about other consumers’ consumption decisions in order
to estimate the network beneﬁts. Following Katz and Shapiro(1985), we will
assume that expectations are fuﬁlled in equilibrium. We elaborate on this
shortly.
Allocations
An allocation describes the pattern of consumption at each node corre-
sponding to each vector of prices. More formally,
Deﬁnition 1 An allocation a is a function a : <2
+ ! <2n
+ , such that for all
(p1;p2) and for all i 2 I, ai1(p1;p2) + ai2(p1;p2) · ®i.Here, aij(p1;p2) is the amount of brand j consumed at node i corresponding
to prices (p1;p2).
Consumers’ decisions about which brand to purchase will determine which
allocation is “observed” in the market. Since such allocations are the outcome
of utility-maximising behaviour, it makes sense to impose some restrictions
on “permissible” allocations.
Deﬁnition 2 Let a be an allocation. Choose any non-negative prices (p1;p2),
and any node i 2 I. Then, a satisﬁes
(i) Individual Rationality if for j = 1;2, aij(p1;p2) > 0 implies that pj ¡
aij(p1;p2) ¡
P
s2L(i) asj(p1;p2) · ri
(ii) Incentive Compatibility if for j = 1;2, aij(p1;p2) > 0 implies that pj ¡
aij(p1;p2)¡
P




Individual Rationality expresses the requirement that consumers will not
purchase any commodity whose hedonic price exceeds their basic willingness
to pay, while Incentive Compatibility incorporates the idea that consumers
purchase the good with the lower hedonic price.
Throughout this paper, we assume that all allocations satisfy Incentive
Compatibility and Individual Rationality. These are minimal requirements
which arise straightaway from utility-maximising behaviour. Since the pat-
tern of consumption also depends on consumers’ expectations, it may be
possible to justify or rationalise allocations which satisfy these restrictions,
but are nevertheless non-intuitive simply because of the self-fulﬁlling nature
of expectations. Suppose, for instance that “initial” prices of the two brands
are p1 and p2. Now, let there be an increase in the price of brand 1, with p2remaining constant. If all consumers now expect everyone to switch to brand
1, then this may turn out to be self-fulﬁlling because the network externali-
ties associated with brand 1 are now much larger and so the hedonic price of
brand 1 is correspondingly lower at all nodes. The following assumption is
imposed to bring about some regularity on how the pattern of consumption
changes with changes in prices.
Assumption 1: An allocation a is non-perverse in prices if for all i 2 I and
j = 1;2, aij(pj;pk) is non-increasing in pj and non-decreasing in pk.
By itself, Assumption 1 imposes a very weak restriction on how allocations
change with respect to a change in prices. In particular, Assumption 1 still
allows for allocations which seem somewhat counterintuitive. Consider, for
example, a network structure in which nodes i and j are linked, and such that
at prices (p1;p2), all consumers at node i are consuming say brand 1 because
the hedonic price of brand 1 is smaller than the hedonic price of brand 2 by
®i. Suppose there is an arbitrarily small reduction in the price of p2. Then,
Assumption 1 allows for the possibility that all consumers at node i will
switch brands and consume only brand 2. Of course, if all consumers expect
this to happen, then the self-fulﬁlling nature of expectations guarantees that
the allocation will satisfy Incentive Compatibility and Assumption 1. In order
to rule out such changes, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 2: For every i 2 I, the component ai of an allocation a is
continuous except possibly at any (p1;p2) where the hedonic prices are equal.
Deﬁnition 3 An allocation is admissible if it satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2.
Since an individual’s net utility depends on the actions of other consumers,
the optimal decisions of consumers may depend on whether consumers cancoordinate their actions. Consider, for example, a situation where node i is
not linked to any other node, p1 ¡ ®i < ri < p1 < p2. Then, consumers at
node i can derive some net utility if all consumers consume brand 1. On
the other hand, no consumer on her own will want to consume either brand.
In one subsequent result, we will assume that consumers at each node can
coordinate their actions when this is mutually proﬁtable.
Assumption C: At any node i and prices (p1;p2),if minj2f1;2g(pj ¡ ®i ¡
P
s2L(i)
asj(p1;p2)) < ri, then ai1(p1;p2) + ai2(p1;p2) = ®i.
Assumption C states that if consumers at any node can coordinate their
consumption decisions and attain strictly positive utility, then no consumer
will abstain from consumption.
Firms
There are two ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent brand. For expositional
purposes, let brand j refer to output produced by ﬁrm j;j = 1;2. For
simplicity, we assume that ﬁrms have zero cost of production.
Both ﬁrms anticipate the same allocation, and choose prices simultane-
ously to maximise proﬁts. Given any allocation a, ﬁrm j’s proﬁt correspond-






An equilibrium will be a set of prices (p1;p2) and an admissible alloca-
tion such that each ﬁrm j maximises proﬁt given the other ﬁrm’s price and
the allocation rule, while the allocation a satisﬁes individual rationality and
incentive compatibility. Notice that the restrictions on a ensure that con-
sumers’ expectations are fulﬁlled in equilibrium.Deﬁnition 4 A vector (p¤
1;p¤
2;a¤) constitutes an equilibrium if
(i) The allocation a¤ is admissible, and satisﬁes Individual Rationality and
Incentive Compatibility
(ii) For each i = 1;2, ¼i(p¤
i;p¤
j;a¤) ¸ ¼i(pi;p¤
j;a¤) for all pi.
We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium always exists.
Theorem 1 For all graphs g, the vector (p¤
1;p¤
2;a¤) is an equilibrium where
p¤
1 = p¤




2 for each i 2 I whenever p1 = p2.
Proof: Consider any node i. Since p¤
1 = p¤
2, and the allocation divides
consumers equally between the two brands, the two hedonic prices must be
equal at each node. Since the hedonic prices are also negative, the allocation
satisﬁes incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
So, we only need to check that both ﬁrms are maximising proﬁts. Notice
that for each ﬁrm i, ¼i(p¤
1;p¤
2;a¤) = 0. Clearly, neither ﬁrm has an incentive






j) at each node s 2 I. But, this implies that the hedonic
price of brand i is higher than that of brand j at each node. From incentive
compatibility, a¤
si(pi;p¤
j) = 0 at each node s. Hence, ﬁrm i does not gain by
increasing price.
This completes the proof that (p¤
1;p¤
2;a¤) is an equilibrium.
Notice that in the equilibrium described in Theorem 1, the two hedonic
prices are equal at each node. The pair of prices remain in equilibrium
because neither ﬁrm wants to deviate by quoting a lower price since the
“current” level is already zero. The lemma below shows that this is the onlycase when hedonic prices can be equal at any node. That is, if hedonic prices
are equal at any node i, and brand j is consumed at this node, then the price
of brand k (k 6= j) must be zero - the latter condition ensures that ﬁrm k
has no incentive to lower price any further in order to capture a larger share
of the market.








j = 1;2 and k 6= j, either aij(p1;p2) = 0 or pk = 0.
Proof. Suppose (p1;p2;a) is an equilibrium, and the two hedonic prices are
equal at node i. Without loss of generality, let ai1(p1;p2) > 0 and p2 >
0. Suppose ﬁrm 2 lowers its price to p0
2 = p2 ¡ ². Since a is admissible,
ai1(p1;p0
2) · ai1(p1;p2) and ai2(p1;p0
2) ¸ ai2(p1;p2). Since p0
2 < p2, the hedonic
price of brand 2 is lower than that of brand 1 at node i for all permissible
values of ai1(p1;p0
2). Since a satisﬁes incentive compatibility, it must be the
case that ai1(p1;p2) = 0 and ai2(p1;p0
2) = ®i.6 So, ﬁrm 2 can capture the entire
market at node i by lowering price. So, this increases proﬁt by ai1(p1;p2)(p2¡
²). The loss of proﬁt at other nodes can be made arbitrarily small by choosing
an appropriately small ².
Hence, ﬁrm 2 cannot be maximising proﬁt at (p1;p2). This contradiction
establishes the result.
3 Market Segmentation
Both ﬁrms had positive market share at each node in the equilibrium con-
structed in Theorem 1. However, this was not surprising since neither ﬁrm
6The latter follows because consumers at node i were purchasing at prices (p1;p2), and so had non-negative
utility. Hence, they must be purchasing at price p0
2 since the hedonic price of brand 2 is now lower.had any incentive to cut into the other ﬁrm’s market share as prices were
driven down to zero. The purpose of this section is to show that some net-
work structure(s) representing interactions between consumer groups may
result in segmented markets with both ﬁrms earning strictly positive prof-
its although ﬁrms are competing in prices. A formal deﬁnition of market
segmentation follows.
Deﬁnition 5 : An equilibrium (p1;p2;a) exhibits strong market segmentation
if there are nodes i and j such that ai1(p1;p2) = ®i, aj2(p1;p2) = ®j and pk > 0
for k = 1;2.
Proposition 1 : There exists a network with strong market segmentation.
Proof: Consider a network (I;g) where I = f1;2;3g and g = f12;13g. That
is, there are three consumer groups with group one connected to groups two
and three. Note that nodes 2 and 3 are not connected. The description of
the “market” is completed with the following speciﬁcation and population
shares and basic willingness to pay for each node.
(i) r1 = 10;®1 = 1.
(ii) r2 = 60;®2 = 19.
(iii) r3 = 5;®3 = 80.
Consider an admissible allocation a¤ which satisﬁes the following restric-
tions.
(i) a¤
11(p1;p2) = ®1 if p1 ¡ ®1 ¡ ®3 · min(p2 ¡ ®2;r1).
(ii) a¤




2 = 79. Then, we claim that (p¤
1;p¤
2;a¤) is an
equilibrium with strong market segmentation.
To check our claim, we ﬁrst observe that a¤
31(p¤
1;p¤







2) = ®1. It is easy to check that a¤ satisﬁes individual rationality
and incentive compatibility.
Now, we show that neither ﬁrm i has any incentive to deviate from p¤
i.
First, if ﬁrm 1 raises its price, then consumers at node 3 will drop out of the
market. So, ﬁrm 1 will not raise price. Next, in order to cut into ﬁrm 2’s
market share at node 2, ﬁrm 1 will have to reduce price to just below 61 from
(ii) above. But, then ﬁrm 1’s proﬁt will be at most 6100, whereas its current
proﬁt is 6966. So, ﬁrm 1 has no incentive to change price if p¤
2 = 79.
Finally, we check ﬁrm 2’s incentives. It cannot raise price above 79 because
consumers at node 2 will then drop out of the market. From (i) above, it
would have to lower price to just below 24 in order to attract consumers at
node 1. But, this gives it a proﬁt of at most 480. It can capture the entire
market if it charges a price less than 7. But, that would yield a proﬁt of less
than 700, whereas its current proﬁt is 1501.





How is it that both ﬁrms are earning positive proﬁts despite being Bertrand
duopolists? If prices are strictly positive, then lemma 1 implies that at each
node, all consumers buy only one brand.7 In particular, the incentive com-
patibility constraint cannot be binding. So, each ﬁrm i will have to lower its
price by an amount ²i strictly bounded away from zero in order to eat into its
rival’s market share. So, strong market segmentation can be sustained if ²i is
suﬃciently large so as to make the revenue loss from its existing customers
7In general, consumers at some node may also refrain from buying either brand.larger than the gain in revenue from new customers.
There is nothing pathological about the network structure used in the
proof of the previous proposition. So, this suggests that market segmentation
of this kind can arise quite generally, although we have not been able to derive
any suﬃcient conditions.
In the remainder of this section, we show that there are types of network
structures which cannot give rise to market segmentation. The ﬁrst such
structure is when all customers are linked to each other, while the second is
when the network structure exhibits a speciﬁc type of symmetry: nodes can
be ordered so that node i is connected only to nodes i¡1 and i+1,8 and all
nodes have the same measure of consumers (say) ®, while consumers at all
nodes also derive the same gross beneﬁt, say r.
Theorem 2 : If (I;g) is a complete network, then there cannot be strong
market segmentation.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that an equilibrium with strong market
segmentation exists. Let (p1;p2) be the equilibrium prices. Since (I;g) is
complete, the hedonic price of each brand is the same at all nodes. So, let
(h1;h2) denote the hedonic prices corresponding to (p1;p2). Consider any
node i where consumers buy brand 1. Incentive compatibility requires that
h1 · h2. Similarly, by considering any node j where consumers buy only
brand 2, we get h2 · h1.
Hence, h1 = h2. But,this contradicts Lemma 1.
The following lemma will be used in the proof of the next theorem.
8That is, g is a circle.Lemma 2 Suppose (p1;p2;a) is an equilibrium with strong market segmen-
tation, and a satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2. Then for each brand j, there
exists a node i such that aij(p1;p2) > 0 and ui(j;pj) = 0.
Proof: Suppose that for every node i with aij(p1;p2) > 0, we have ui(j;pj) >
0. Since there is strong market segmentation, pj > 0. Therefore, by Lemma
1,
pj ¡ aij(pj;pk) ¡
X
s2L(i)




By continuity of a, ﬁrm j can raise price pj slightly - Incentive Compati-
bility and Individual Rationality of a ensure that consumption of brand j at
each node remains as before. So, ﬁrm j0s proﬁt is higher. This contradicts
the assumption that (p1;p2;a) is an equilibrium.
Theorem 3 Suppose (I;g) is a circle such that all consumers have the same
basic willingness to pay r, and all nodes have the same measure of consumers
®. Then there cannot be strong market segmentation if Assumption C is
satisﬁed.
Proof: Suppose to the contrary that (p1;p2;a) is an equilibrium with strong
market segmentation. If jIj · 3, this is ruled out by Theorem 2. So let
jIj > 3. We proceed in steps.
Step 1: At all nodes i, either ai1(p1;p2) = ® or ai2(p1;p2) = ®. That is, all
consumers at each node buy one of the two brands.
Proof of Step 1: We already know from lemma 1 that consumers at each
node will completely specialise in one brand if they buy at all. So, we only
need to prove that no consumer abstains from consumption.Since there is market segmentation, there must be some node i where
all consumers buy say brand 1. We want to show that no consumer at node
(i¡1) abstains from consumption. Either consumers at node (i+1) purchase
brand 1 or they do not do so. In either case, from Individual Rationality,
p1 ¡ 2® · r
Notice that if ﬁrm 1 lowers price slightly, then the hedonic price of brand
1 at node (i ¡ 1) will be strictly lower if all consumers at node i buy 1.
Assumption C ensures that no consumer abstains from consumption.
Step 2: If brand j is consumed at node i, then it is consumed at either node
(i ¡ 1) or node (i + 1).
Proof of Step 2: In view of Step 1, assume that brand k is consumed at
nodes (i ¡ 1) and (i + 1). By Incentive Compatibility at i, we have
pj ¡ ® < pk ¡ 2® (1)
The smallest possible hedonic price of brand k at node (i ¡ 1) is pk ¡ 2®
- this happens when consumers at (i ¡ 2) consume k. The biggest possible
hedonic price of brand j at (i¡1) is pj¡®. Equation (1) shows that Incentive
Compatibility is violated at node (i ¡ 1).
Step 3: p1 = p2 = r + 2®.
Proof of Step 3: Since g is a circle, Steps 1 and 2 imply that there exist
nodes i and (i+1) such that consumers at nodes i and (i¡1) consume brand
j, while consumers at nodes (i + 1) and (i + 2) consume brand k. So, the
hedonic prices of brands j and k at nodes i and (i+1) respectively are pj¡2®
and pk ¡ 2®. Also, if brand j is consumed at some node p, then its hedonic
price at p cannot exceed pj ¡2®.9 Lemma 2 now completes the proof of Step
9It could be pj ¡ 3® if j is consumed at both nodes (p ¡ 1) and (p + 1).Step 4: Suppose N1 is the set of nodes where brand 1 is consumed. Without
loss of generality, let #N1 = n1 · n
2. Firm 1’s proﬁt is
¼1(p1;p2) = p1n1®
Let ﬁrm 1 lower price to p0
1 = p1¡®¡². It is easy to check that at (p0
1;p2),
ﬁrm 1 captures the entire market. Its proﬁt is now
¼1(p0
1;p2) = (p1 ¡ ® ¡ ²)n®
Since n1 · n
2, ﬁrm 1 can choose ² suﬃciently small so that ¼1(p0
1;p2) >
¼1(p1;p2).
Hence, (p1;p2;a) cannot be an equilibrium. This completes the proof of
the theorem.
Remark 1 : Assumption C plays a crucial role in the theorem. If Assump-
tion C does not hold, then even when the network is a symmetric circle, one
can have market segmentation of the following kind : p1 = p2 = r + ®, and
consumers at nodes i;i + 2;i + 4;::: abstain from consumption, while con-
sumers at nodes i + 1;i + 3;::: consume either of the two brands.
Remark 2 Even if Assumption C holds, it is not in general true that strong
market segmentation can occur at an equilibrium in all symmetric graphs.
4 Discussion
We comment below on possible extensions of the basic model outlined in this
paper.
We have assumed that the two ﬁrms produce incompatible brands. Sup-
pose instead that the two brands are fully compatible. For a consumer at anynode i, the network beneﬁt from consuming either brand is then the same:
it is the total measure of consumers of brands 1 and 2 at all adjacent nodes.
Therefore, Incentive Compatibility implies that at any node i, consumers
will simply buy the cheaper brand. The only equilibrium outcome possible
then has zero prices and proﬁts; strong market segmentation is ruled out.
However, with partial compatibility, strong market segmentation can exist
for exactly the same reason as in the basic model of this paper.
This has an obvious implication if the choice of compatibility is endoge-
nous. Consider a network structure that permits equilibria with strong mar-
ket segmentation when brands are incompatible. Suppose that before the
ﬁrms compete in prices, they decide whether or not to make their brands
compatible with each other, say, by providing a two way converter. Assume
that if both play “Yes”, then the brands are compatible, whereas if at least
one plays “No”, they are incompatible. Following this, there is price compe-
tition. If both play “Yes”, price competition leads to zero proﬁts. This is not
an equilibrium, since if even a single ﬁrm plays “No”, the ﬁrms can then co-
ordinate on a positive proﬁt, strong market segmentation equilibrium. This
provides a justiﬁcation for observing the existence of incompatible brands,
even under price competition with unlimited capacities, and no diﬀerences in
intrinsic product quality.
Addition of a link or edge to a graph increases the network eﬀect at least on
the nodes that are incident on the new edge. This can increase willingness to
pay at these nodes, if they were consuming the same brand. However, whether
proﬁts increase in equilibrium depends crucially on the graph structure. For
example, the equilibrium in Proposition 1 exhibits positive proﬁts for the
ﬁrms; however, if we add a link between nodes 2 and 3, we get a complete
graph, which, by Theorem 2, implies a zero proﬁt equilibrium. Similarly, onecan show that if one starts with a graph for which strong market segmentation
does not exist, and adds links/nodes to it, strong market segmentation can
appear in the resulting graph. Thus it is not necessarily the case that if
consumers are ‘more connected’, then the market tends to be less segmented
- although the complete graph does not allow market segmentation and hence
positive proﬁts.
We note brieﬂy that if consumers’ expectations regarding network size, as
captured in the allocation rule, are skewed enough, then a monopoly outcome
is possible. In general, there can be multiple equilibria. This is a well known
problem in network externalities models, arising from the possibility of mul-
tiple admissible network size expectations . A useful extension would be to
consider reasonable restrictions on allocation rules to prune the number of
equilibria. While Theorem 1 gives us the lowest proﬁt equilibrium, it remains
to characterize the highest proﬁt equilibrium for a given network structure.
There can be various other context speciﬁc extensions to the model. One
extension could be to study competition when brands may diﬀer in intrinsic
quality. Another could be to study models in which the diﬀerent nodes have
diﬀerent physical interpretations. For instance, in several models of compe-
tition in two-sided markets (see Armstrong (2002)), agents on the two sides
of a market have diﬀerent roles, (e.g., consumers and retailers, with shopping
malls as intermediaries) and it is reasonable to study the possibility that
a ﬁrm such as a mall owner would charge diﬀerent prices from consumers
and retailers. The model in the present paper studies multilateral, rather
than bilateral relationships; in applications where diﬀerent nodes have dis-
tinct physical interpretations or roles, one can study the possibility of price
discrimination by ﬁrms.References
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